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Sutirinary  findings
Claessens  and  Djankov  test  several  propositions  derived  State-owned enterprises  employ  more  workers,  have
by Shicifer  and  Vlishny (1994,  1996)  about  how  lower  worker  prodLictivitv,  receive  more  financinig and
privatization and stabilization (hard budget constraints)  direct subsidies, and have higher variable costs than
afect  enterprise behavior.  privatized firms, particularly firms privatized for mnore
They document the changes in financing, employmen.t,  than three years. Privatized firmns  also consistently
and operating efficiency that have occurred in more tlhan  outperform state enterprises in productivity growth.
6,300 manufacturing enterprises in seven Central and  Over time, the role of politicians in allocating bank
Easterii European countries (Bulgaria, C  zech Republic,  financing and subsidies appears to have declined,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and  however, and banks have played a greater role in
Slovenia). They then compare the relative performance  (efficiently) allocating resources. And the institutional
of privatized and state-owned enterprises.  environment appears to have improved in nmost
Controlling for institutional differences and the  countries, suggesting that the influence of corruption has
endogeneity of privatizationi choices, they find that  declined over time.
privatization is associated with significant improvements  The results - which provide significant support  for
in total factor productivity and reductions in  the Shleifer-Vislny model - demonstrate the beneficial
employment. Reductions in soft financing are associated  effects of privatization in the presence of stabilization
with further productivity gains.  and decreasing corruption.
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1.  Introduction
Many countries have launched large-scale privatization programs in the last two decades,
including developing countries (such as Mexico) as well as developed countries (such as France
and the United Kingdom).  The most ambitious privatization programs, however, have been the
ones undertaken in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.  In these  economies,  all enterprises were  state-owned  in  1990, but  by  1996  several
transition economies had privatized the majority of them.  For example, 90% of Czech enterprises
were  transferred to  private  hands in the  period  1992-96.  Despite the  scale of  privatization
programs in both market economies and transition economies, only limited empirical evidence has
been available on the effects of privatization on enterprise performance and aggregate welfare.
Answers are still incomplete to critical questions like: do privatized firms become more profitable;
if so, when; do they restructure more; if so, why; do they increase productivity, if so, how.
In  spite of  strongly held convictions about the benefits of privatization among policy
advisors and international development agencies, the answers to these questions are not  obvious
from a theoretical standpoint.  Theory would indicate that state enterprises can perform better
than privatized firms in maximizing social welfare.  State enterprises are more likely to take into
account externalities-differences  between private and social returns  and benefits-arising  from
differences in private and social objectives and monopoly power (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
Externalities could arise from spillovers, e.g., technology transfer (positive spillover), pollution
(negative spillover); or from vertical or horizontal linkages between firms.  Market power has
often been used as an argument for state ownership in developing countries given the often small
size of their markets and the difficulty  in regulating natural monopolies.  At the same time, theory
argues,  state enterprises need not be worse in producing efficiently and charging prices which
reflect  marginal costs.  If  the  institutional environment were  properly  established,  sufficient
competition  in the  product  market  could make ownership structure  irrelevant in determining
enterprise performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
The empirical findings to date, however, cast doubt on these theoretical predictions.  State
enterprises are generally found to be less efficient, have excess labor and higher wages, tend to
accumulate losses, and do not necessarily take into account externalities (e.g., state enterprises in
Brazil were found to pollute more, World Bank  1995; state enterprises in the Slovak Republic
were  less willing to  buy  advanced technology from  foreign firms, Djankov  and  Pohl  1997).
Studies  generally  find  that  private  ownership  is  associated  with  higher  efficiency,  higher
profitability, more  shedding of excess labor and  greater  overall welfare  (Galal et  al.,  1994).
Relatedly, privatization has been found to lead to significant improvements in firm performance
(see Vining and Boardman, 1992 for a survey).
Critics of the benefits of privatization have pointed to a number of measurement problems
in these empirical studies.  The majority of studies rely on a small number of privatized firms and
often simply compare enterprise performance before and after privatization.  Examples include
2Galal et al., 1994, Megginson et al., 1994, Boubakri and Cosset,  1997.  Such studies  do not
address  the  endogenous  nature  of privatization.  For  example, governments  often  resort  to
privatization when the economy is doing badly (see Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli,
1993 for theoretical models). Better enterprises are also more likely to be privatized. By the time
privatization programs  are  implemented, the  economy is  frequently in  an  upturn  and  better
enterprises are likely to increase productivity more regardless of ownership.  A second group of
studies (Picot and Kaulmann, 1989; Vining and Boardman, 1992; LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes,
1997) attempts to alleviate  these identification problems by including in their analysis state-owned
enterprises operating in the  same sector(s) as  a control group.  These three  studies,  however,
suffer from inadequate data coverage.  Lastly, none of the empirical work to-date  has controlled
for the effect of different institutional environments, especially the overall extemal environment
including monetary stability, although this is a major component of the theory of privatization (an
exception is Picot and Kaulmann, 1989). This is because data are frequently analyzed for a single
country only.
The Shleifer and Vishny (1994 and 1996, SV) model provides a more complete analytical
framework to study the benefits of privatization. It investigates the interests of politicians to have
state enterprises employ excess people at above market wages so as to  obtain more political
support.  The model also incorporates the effect of corruption on enterprise performance and
indicates a number of specific hypotheses. First, privatization alone will not  lead to  improved
efficiency. A necessary condition for privatization to generate efficiency gains is a simultaneous
improvement in the overall legal and judicial framework leading to  a  reduction in corruption.
Second, only when privatization is accompanied by  allocation of  control  rights to  managers,
deregulation and increases in competition, will there be positive impacts on firm performance.
Third, corporatization can promote enterprise restructuring, even though it may soften the budget
constraints  enterprises  face.  Fourth,  corruption  may  have  stimulative  effects  on  enterprise
restructuring  as  it  allows  managers and  politicians to  "contract"  in  achieving more  efficient
allocation of resources.  Finally, stabilization, i.e., a  reduction in subsidies and  soft credits to
enterprises, will have large allocative and efficiency  benefits.
This  paper  builds on  the  SV  model by  documenting the  impact of  privatization  on
enterprise performance for a sample of more than 6,300 former and still state-owned firms from
seven Central and Eastem European countries.  Our analysis accounts for the effect of different
institutional environments by controlling for country-specific factors, for the  effect of  market
competition by controlling for industry-specific factors, and for the sample selection problem by
correcting for  possible endogeneity of privatization outcomes.  In  particular, we  follow  the
performance of privatized firms over time, i.e., before and after privatization, as well as their
relative performance in comparison to still state-owned firms in the same sector and country.  We
also use  a two-step  estimation procedure that allows us to  test  several theoretical predictions
without introducing measurement problems that have plagued previous empirical studies.
We find strong supportive evidence  for the predictions of the SV model. The results show
that, on average, privatized firms have five times higher total factor productivity growth than still
state-owned enterprises even when one controls for the endogeneity of privatization choices, the
degree of bank lending and subsidies, and the different levels of corruption and development of
3legal frameworks across countries.  Privatized firms also reduce their excess labor by 20% more
than comparable, still state-owned firms and cease to receive direct government subsidies. These
differences in performance between privatized and state-owned enterprises cannot be attributed to
the overall environment in which enterprises operate nor to the selection bias introduced in the
privatization programs.  We  also find  empirical evidence for the  SV-prediction that  lack  of
monetary tightness discourages enterprise restructuring, at least in the early period of transition.
The role of politicians in allocating bank financing and subsidies appears to  have declined over
time, however, and the importance of banks in allocating resources (efficiently) increased. Finally,
the overall environment appears to  have improved in almost all countries, suggesting that  the
influence of corruption has declined.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the previous empirical literature
on  the benefits of privatization and the arguments of  its critics.  Section 3  develops several
testable hypotheses based on the Shleifer-Vishny 1994 model.  Section 4 describes the dataset
(and  its drawbacks)  and provides simple statistics on  several variables of interest.  Section 5
details  the  empirical research  design.  Section  6  provides  descriptive  statistics  of  the  main
variables, while Section 7 reports the results from the tests of the SV model.  Section 8 concludes.
H.  The empirical literature on privatization
There is a substantial empirical literature examining  the relative performance of public and
private enterprises.  This work was motivated by the notion that private ownership leads to better
incentives to monitor managers which in turn would raise enterprise performance.  Since there did
not  exist  a  rigorous  theoretical framework to  underlie  such empirical analysis, the  evidence
remained mostly anecdotal and frequently led to conflicting conclusions. On the one hand, several
papers  (Kay and Thompson,  1986;  Millward, 1982; Wortzel and Wortzel,  1989) argued that
increased competition in product markets is a more important determinant of improved allocative
efficiency than privatization.  Boresherding et al. (1982), for example, find that "given sufficient
competition between public and private producers, the differences in unit costs  turn out  to  be
insignificant." On the other hand, a number of other papers (Bailey, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1989;
Kikeri et al., 1994) present (mostly anecdotal) evidence of the beneficial role of privatization in
enhancing enterprise efficiency.
The difficulty of the previous empirical research to  establish a conclusive analysis on the
benefits of privatization was in part due to the limited natural experiments of privatization prior to
the programs in Mexico and the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s.  In the majority of cases,
privatization occurred in a small number of utility enterprises (telecoms, airlines, oil refineries).  A
recent survey (Vining and Boardman, 1992) covers 87 papers on the effects of privatization. Of
those, only two (Broadman and Vining, 1989; Picot and Kaulmann, 1989) focus on competitive
sectors  rather  than  on  regulated  monopolies  or  oligopolies.  The  authors  argue,  as  does
subsequent research, that  utility privatizations do  not  provide a  useful test  of the benefits of
privatization  since these  enterprises  still fall under  often unchanged  government  regulatory
frameworks. Hence the effect of privatization cannot be measured separately since productivity
gains are confounded by the effects of (lack of) changes in the regulatory framework.  Also, 74 of
4these studies  use data on developed  countries  only. This may  be of little relevance  for developing
and transition  economies  which  do not have a well-established  regulatory  framework,  and highly-
qualified  public  sector managers  as those in the United  Kingdom.  Thus, the frequent rejection  of
the hypothesis  that privatization  leads to performance  improvements  (only 28 of the 87 studies
report such  findings)  may  not be surprising.
The more recent empirical  literature on privatization  focuses on developing  countries
(LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997) or  on  a  cross-section of  industrialized  and  semi-
industrialized  countries  (Boubakri  et al., 1997) of firms  in (mostly) competitive  sectors.  These
studies use larger datasets  which allow for a direct test of the relative efficiency  of state-owned
versus private enterprises,  but  do not take into account the effect of  different institutional
environments.  No study to-date has, for example,  estimated  the separate  effects of privatization
and stabilization  (hardening  of budget constraints). An exception  is Picot and Kaulmann,  1992
which controls for country and sector effects in a cross-section  of six developed countries.
Nevertheless,  privatization  is found to have a positive effect on profitability,  labor productivity,
and new investment  flows  in all three studies.
Much of the empirical  literature on the benefits of privatization  preceded the theory of
privatization  and hence lacked a methodological  framework to  analyze its findings.  It  did,
however, serve -- coupled with a healthy doze of faith -- as the basis for the  large scale
privatization  programs  in the transition  economies. Now, equipped  with both the SV model  on
the benefits  of privatization  and data from seven  transition  economies, it is an opportune  time to
test some  of the hypotheses  on the relationships  between  privatization  and firm  performance.
11.  The new  theory of politicians  and firms
With  the collapse  of central-planning  in Central and  Eastern Europe and the (then) Soviet
Union  interest in the theory of privatization  emerged. The pathbreaking  study in this literature
(Boycko  et al., 1993)  was motivated  by (and influenced)  the Russian  mass-privatization  program.
The model,  and its subsequent  refinements  (Shleifer  and Vishny,  1994 and 1996),  focuses on the
separate impact of  privatization, deregulation, and  stabilization,  as  well as  corruption on
enterprise  performance. It identified  a number  of specific  empirically  testable hypotheses. The
model cast doubt on the robustness  of previous empirical  findings  which did not account for
deregulation,  stabilization,  and  corruption,  and narrowly  focused  on privatization.
The SV model  centers  around  the political  economy  aspects  of privatization.  In particular,
the focus is on the interests  of politicians  to have state enterprises  employ  excess  people at above
market  wages (or to charge  prices  below marginal  factor costs to favored  consumer  groups or be
inefficient  more generally)  so as to obtain more political  support. The SV model separates  the
effects of control rights and cash flow rights.  Four types of firms are distinguished:  state
enterprises,  i.e., with control  rights and cash flow rights  in the hands of the state;  commercialized
state enterprises,  i.e., with control rights with managers but cash flow rights with the state;
regulated  private firms,  i.e., with control  rights but no cash flow rights with private owners; and
private  firms, i.e., with control  rights and cash flow rights  with private owners.  The SV model
5also allows for a discussion of the effects of the degree of corruption and bribes on enterprise
performance under various scenarios of privatization and commercialization.
The SV model indicates a number of specific hypotheses. First, with full corruption, the
allocation of control and cash flow rights does not influence the resource allocation.  Basically, a
Coase Theorem holds as managers and politicians internalize all benefits and costs and obtain an
efficient allocation of resources. Privatization alone will not  change the resource allocation.  A
necessary condition for privatization to generate efficiency  gains is a simultaneous improvement in
the overall legal and judicial framework leading to a reduction in corruption. Second, privatization
in  itself may not  have the  desirable consequences  of  lowering excess  labor  and  improving
efficiency. Only when privatization is accompanied by allocation of control rights to managers,
deregulation and increases in competition, will there be positive impacts. Third, corporatization
can promote enterprise restructuring, even though it may soften the budget constraints enterprises
face. Fourth,  corruption may have stimulative effects on enterprise restructuring  as it  allows
managers and politicians to  "contract" in achieving more efficient allocation of resources. Fifth,
stabilization, i.e., a reduction in subsidies and soft credits from the central bank to enterprises, will
have large allocative and efficiency  benefits.
These hypotheses already suggest a number of simple comparisons between state-owned
and privatized enterprises. State enterprises should have higher costs,  receive more subsidies,
employ  relatively more  labor,  and  have  generally lower  labor  productivity  than  privatized
enterprises.  The hypotheses also suggest a number of important factors to include in the empirical
research design.  First,  one  needs to  control for overall changes in the  external environment
enterprises face.  This concerns both the degree of (de)regulation and the degree of competition.
Many  privatizations  take  place  in  a  rapidly changing economic environment, particularly  in
transition economies. Prices are being deregulated, trade barriers removed, and more new entry is
allowed for.  This may affect performance and other measures of enterprise restructuring even in
the absence of privatization, e.g., profitability may decrease as a result of increased competition,
or increase as a result of prices being liberalized. It is not sufficient then to compare performance
measures before and after privatization. Obviously, it is difficult  to control for the specific external
environment each  enterprise  faces,  as  this  will  depend on  country-wide  and  sector-specific
government policies, market structure, etc. One way to  account for  these conditions is to use
panel regressions and include both state-owned and privatized enterprises in the same sectors and
countries.  This allows  one to  capture  the  effect of privatization by "mean-differencing" the
various  measures of  enterprise  performance, taking  state-owned  enterprise  performance as  a
benchmark.
Second, the  SV model indicates that the  overall legal and regulatory  framework (and
possibly different social norms) needs to be to controlled for as it affects the degree of corruption.
This could be done by using some of the institutional indexes which are now often utilized in
cross-country growth regressions.  Many of the cross-country indexes used for  describing the
overall policy and institutional environment do not, however, show much variation for the Central
and East European  countries covered here (Claessens et al.,  1997b). The Czech Republic and
Hungary, for example, get identical ratings on all available indices although there are substantial
differences in the speed (and sequencing) of institutional reforms in the two countries.  A better
6way to control for institutional  differences  across  countries  and over time is to use enterprise  data
from several countries, i.e., enterprises  under different  institutional  environments,  and apply a
random-effects  model. This  way one controls  for differences  in the legal and other aspects of the
overall  external  environment,  as well  as enterprise-specific  heterogeneity.
Third, the SV model  indicates  that the degree  of stabilization  can greatly affect enterprise
performance.  Improvements  in  enterprise performance may then wrongly be  attributed to
privatization  when they are mainly  due to hardening  of the budget constraint. A cross-country
comparison  through  a panel approach  would correct for differences  in overall  monetary  tightness.
But, the hardening  of the budget  constraint  may  differ  across  enterprises,  as the political  costs and
benefits of  soft budgets may depend on the  size of the  enterprise, the  labor intensity of
production,  type of products, etc. It is thus necessary  to use firm-specific  proxies for hardening
of the budget  constraint. One candidate  is the (change  in the) amount  of new bank lending  to the
enterprise  in question  since,  ex-post,  much  of it often ended  up being subsidies  in disguise.  Direct
subsidies  from the state can also be included.
Fourth, and this a more general point, the SV model indicates that it is necessary  to
control for initial  conditions  at the enterprise  level. Enterprises  are differently  endowed  in terms
of quality  of machinery,  labor,  management,  links  with foreign  markets,  etc. This is especially  the
case in transition economies  where the decisions  on new investment,  worker training,  etc., were
taken at the central  level and were seldom  driven  by previous  track record. It may have given
some firms a competitive  advantage  or disadvantage  once liberalization  took place, leading to
higher  or lower profitability.  Some  of this can be captured  by controlling  for sectors,  but not all.
Provided  there is no clear relationship  of initial conditions  with privatization,  this still need not
bias any results. There has been a presumption,  however,  that better firms  are more likely  to be
privatized.  As a  result, measures of  productivity  would be  biased when comparing the
performance  of privatized  and state-owned  enterprises. One should  thus control for the initial
level of productivity. Furthermore,  it can be expected,  as confirmed  for market economies,  that
firms' productivity  tends to converge over time, i.e.,  increased competition  will make higher
profitable  firms less profitable  (Waring, 1996). When combined  with a selection  bias of better
firms more likely to  be privatized, this may mean that in terms of changes in profitability,
privatization  is associated  with an actual  worsening  of performance  over time.
The SV model  also suggests  a number  of clear predictions  of the effects of privatization
on profitability,  labor and efficiency. These are summarized  in Table 1.  Under full corruption
excess labor is not reduced and efficiency  does not change  with privatization.  The only affected
variable  is soft financing  which  decreases  as politicians  incur  higher cost in handing  out subsidies.
The effect of privatization  in the absence of deregulation  and without stabilization  leads to
perverse  results. While  in a public  firm  the politician  needs  to pay for excess  employment  through
politically  costly  subsidies,  in a regulated  privatized  firm  he can force the managers  to pay for the
increase in excess labor and decreased efficiency. This suggests that, in the absence of full
corruption,  regulation  might be an even greater problem than public ownership. Privatization
with deregulation,  but without stabilization  increases  soft financing,  as the managers are in a
7better  position to  extract favors from politicians.  On the  other two  restructuring  measures,
excess labor and efficiency, privatization leads to a worsening.  Only with both  deregulation and
stabilization is there an improvement in all three measures.
IV.  Data Description
We  have  firn-level  data  (balance sheet  and  profit  and  loss  statements)  for  1992-95
obtained from private firms (Czech Republic and Hungary) or statistical offices (Bulgaria, Poland,
Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).  Typically, the data cover manufacturing firms which
were registered as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1991.  The data are annual observations at
the plant level and cover the majority of plants in manufacturing industries.  If some plants are
owned by the same parent  company, this relationship is accounted for in the data.  The data,
although not always a complete manufacturing census, are representative of the manufacturing
sector in each country.  Two types of selection bias are present - informal enterprises are excluded
and small formal firms are underrepresented.  Thus the sample primarily covers medium and large
enterprises in the formal sector.
We exclude all firms which have missing observations and form balanced panels, i.e. all
firms show up throughout the 1992-95 period.'  The majority of the excluded firms have missing
values between the beginning and end of the sample period, which suggests that they were not
liquidated. There is no new entry of SOEs in the sample period (entry through split-ups and spin-
offs is captured in the data). The information concerning exit of SOEs is not utilized here since we
cannot distinguish between apparent exit (due to non-reporting) and true exit (due to liquidation
or bankruptcy).
In  three  countries  (Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia) we  have  almost  complete
coverage,  while  the  data  for  the  other  four  countries  contain  about  half  of  the  formal
manufacturing sector.  This is due to two reasons. First, as explained earlier, small firms are not
well-covered in the analysis. In the countries where small business was allowed to operate even
prior to  1991 - Hungary and Poland - this means that  a relatively larger share of firms is not
included.  Second, countries that have introduced changes in enterprise codings also show smaller
coverage.  This is especially the case for Bulgaria, where many firms changed their code number
(as reported  to the  Statistical Office) once they were corporatized in  1994. A similar problem
exists in the Polish data.  During the 1993-95 period, over 1,000 Polish manufacturing firms were
sold through liquidation-privatizations. The process meant that a new company emerged, which
was not easily traceable (by the econometrician) to the old state firm.  This type of enterprises are
hence underrepresented in our data - we have been able to  include only 147 such firms in the
analysis.
Although international accounting standards (IAS) were introduced in all seven countries
(as of January  1995 in Bulgaria and Romania; a year earlier in the other five countries), many
1  This procedure  mostly  affects  the Bulgarian dataset. Although  we have  the complete  manufacturing  census,
only  half  of  all firms  report  consistently  in all years.
8firms still report  according to  the old  system.  For those  firms, we  have used the  conversion
accounting tables for each country as produced by PriceWaterhouse.  The analysis is then based
on IAS across all firms.  Sales and inventory changes are reported in all cases.  This allows us to
adjust the revenue numbers to account for sold (rather than produced) output during the period
when  countries  still used  old  accounting  conventions.  Firm-specific output  prices  are  not
available. Instead, we use output price indices at the industry level, as reported by the respective
statistical  offices. All nominal values  are deflated using  these  price  indices.  This  limits the
comparisons between  firms within the  same sector  and  country,  but  would  not  appear  to
introduce a significant bias in comparisons across sectors or countries.  We recognize, however,
that the  use of  separate inflation corrections across  firms may be  beneficial, given the  likely
variation across  firms. The  last year  of the  sample (1995)  is  taken  as  a  base  year  on  the
assumption that relative prices are closer to relative market prices than in earlier years.
The data on factor inputs include detailed information on firm expenditures, employment,
and average hours worked.  Expenditures on energy are available separately from other material
inputs'  expenditures.  We use  industry-level input and  energy price  indices reported  by the
statistical offices to  deflate nominal values. Following Gordon and Li (1995), we use purchased
inputs rather than used inputs in constructing our material input variable.  Under this definition,
output produced using materials drawn from inventory results in increased productivity. 2 Data on
firm-specific fixed assets are also available but not used in the analysis.  Table 2 lists for each
country the number of firms in the dataset, aggregate employment in 1992, and its share of total
manufacturing employment, and the sectoral distribution of employment, as well as descriptive
statistics on employment (mean and median number of employees).
The data cover 6,354 firms with over 6.5 million employees.  Polish and Romanian firms
are the largest among the seven countries - they have a mean number of employees of 911 and
1,521 respectively.  This is hardly surprising since the two countries have also the largest total
population among the sample countries.  The sectoral distribution of employment in the dataset
varies  across  countries,  with  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  and  Poland  displaying  a  high
concentration in the Non-Electrical machinery sector, Hungary  in  Textiles, Romania  and  the
Slovak Republic in Fabricated metals, and Slovenia in Electrical machinery.
Each firm reports  its ownership status starting in  1991. This is reported  as  a  discrete
variable (privatized\state-owned). In addition, the data show what  ownership share of the firm
went private in a particular year.  To avoid possible differences in the definition of private firms,
we choose to call a firm privatized when more than a third of its shares is privately-owned. This
choice was  made based  on the  existing corporate  laws in  the Central  and Eastern  European
countries. In all seven countries, major strategic and investment decisions at the firms' Board of
Directors can be taken with only two-thirds majority. Thus if more than one-third of shares are
privately owned, collectively private owners can block decisions at the Board.  Based  on this
2  We also took  the used material  expenditures  as a basis for the material  input variable  (not reported). The results
are robust  to either specification.
9criterion, the sample contains 3,752 still state-owned firms in 1995, 365 firms privatized in 1994,
864 firms privatized in  1993, and  1,391 firms privatized before 1993.  The Czech and  Slovak
Republics have the largest share of privatized enterprises - 90% and 80% respectively.  Bulgaria
and Romania,  on the  other hand, privatized only 8% and  12% of their manufacturing sector
during the sample period.
Although the data include information on the type of ownership (foreign strategic investor,
management-employee buy-out,  etc.) we do not  use it in the main part of the analysis.  This
additional data  could  be  used  to  estimate the  effect of  different privatization  strategies  on
enterprise performance.  There already exists a separate (but related) literature on the benefits of
particular types of ownership on firm efficiency (Aghion and Blanchard, 1996; Blanchard, 1996)
that can serve as a basis for such empirical analysis. Several studies (Claessens et al, 1997; Pinto
and Wijnbergen, 1994; Estrin,  1994) have provided some empirical evidence for the impact of
different classes of owners of enterprise performance for  some Central and Eastern European
countries.  We do,  however, use the ownership type information in the sensitivity analysis in
Section VII.
The  data  also  include  information on  outstanding  bank  obligations. We  include this
variable in our analysis of financial tightening.  Ideally, one would like to include wage  arrears,
arrears to suppliers, social security, and the tax office to assess the overall softness of the budget
constraint  for  each  enterprise. Data  on  these variables were  only available for firms  in  two
countries (Bulgaria and Romania) in the  1992-94 period. We do, however, have separately the
level of direct subsidies a firm receives from the state, which are under the control of politicians
and thus relate to the SV model.  Country dummies (Country it)  allow us to investigate whether
there are significant country-specific effects which may change over time. The dummy variables
will also account for any omitted government policies which vary across countries and time and
which may help explain firm performance. Privatization dummies (Privl,  2,  3+  )  are constructed for
each cohort  of firms in terms  of the  number of years  following their  privatization. We thus
construct three privatization dummies: if a firm has been privatized for three or more years (1 if it
has, 0 otherwise), a dummy  for firms that have been privatized for two years, and a dummy for
firms that have been privatized for one year.  Firms that have not yet been privatized are used as a
control  group.  The chosen  construction of the privatization dummies allows us  not  only to
estimate the effect of privatization, but also to follow it through time, i.e., we are able to answer
the question "what was the effect of privatization on TFP growth in firms privatized for n years."
The data have some drawbacks. First, the short time-period allows us to capture the effect
of  privatization for  a  maximum of  four  years  following privatization.  We  might therefore
underestimate the  benefits of privatization. Since most  of the  immediate benefits in transition
economies come in the form of organizational improvement and do not necessarily depend on
longer-term investments, this  probably does not  significantly bias  the  benefits-of-privatization
coefficient. Second, as noted, we do not have adequate data on some important forms of soft
financing such as inter-enterprise arrears, arrears to  the budget, and arrears to  social security.
Their exclusion may lead to an overestimation of the benefits of privatization and underestimation
of the benefits of stabilization. Third, although we have data from seven different countries, they
have  had  similar  institutional  developments (with  the  possible  exceptions  of  Bulgaria  and
10Romania).  The inclusion of some former Soviet Union republics would have added variation in
the analysis. Unfortunately, such data are not  available for  large samples of firms.  Finally, as
earlier theoretical work (Boycko et al., 1993) has argued, privatization can have positive spillover
effects within a country since it creates a market for managers and thus encourages managers of
still state-owned enterprises to perform better.  Thus our specification may underestimate the true
benefits of privatization at the firm level, attributing some part of it to  the improving overall
environment.
V.  Empirical Specifications
To test the SV hypotheses, we employ total  factor productivity growth  (TFPG), which
measures changes in a firm's  efficiency in using inputs (factors of production,  labor, material
inputs,  and  capital) to  produce  a  given level of output.  TFPG  is the  standard  measure  of
productivity and has been widely used in empirical studies of developed economies (Jorgenson et
al., 1987) and developing economies (see the papers in Roberts and Tybout, 1996).  It  has not
been used extensively in transition economies.  The aversion to using TFPG may be based on the
belief that book values of fixed assets are grossly inaccurate and introduce significant noise in any
estimation.  The exclusion of capital as a factor of production, on the other hand, may lead to
biased estimates of productivity-tantamount  to assuming that the intensity of capital usage has
remained  the  same  over  the  transition  period.  We  avoid  both  problems  by  using  energy
consumption as a proxy for capital utilization. 3 This correction has many desirable properties
(Burnside et al.,  1995) and has been shown to be  a good and less volatile measure of capital
services compared to the standard measures.  Most importantly in the transition context, it is a
flow measure  and does  not  depend on  any (accounting) measure  of fixed assets which  may
introduce biases.  Managers  of still state-owned firms, for  example, may have an  interest  in
reducing the reported value of capital in order to lower the price at which they (or their partners)
would purchase the firm thus inflating TFP-growth.  The downside of using energy consumption
as a proxy for capital utilization is that the substitution of additional capital for reduced energy
consumption is obscured.
The TFP-specification we use  has three additional important characteristics.  First, we
estimate directly the marginal product of individual factors, thus allowing for non-zero profits
(and imperfect competition and factor market distortions).  Second, we do not impose constant
returns to scale, as the sum of factor shares is not constrained to add up to one.  The relaxation of
these two standard assumptions is particularly important in transition economies. Third, we allow
for separate production functions for each sector, i.e., we do not impose that firms in all sectors
have identical (at a given point in time) marginal  factor products.
We start with  a standard neo-classical production function
3  An alternative  approach is to correct for missing capital stock numbers and make inflation adjustments.  This
does not address  the fundamental  question whether  capital stock is the  most  appropriate proxy  for  capital
utilization.
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where  sL,  SK and  SM are the shares of labor, capital and material inputs' expenditures in total
expenditure for firm i, y, is the returns-to-scale parameter, and T is the total  factor productivity
parameter.  To avoid imposing cost minimization,  we estimate the marginal product of each input
as follows:
Ay.It  +/83,Al.  +/lMsAmn  +/3KAk.~ +t Yit  t  it  AMs  l,t  t3Ks  it  l,t  (2)
where.Ayi,t  (ln Yi,t - ln Y it-,) is the log-difference in total revenues, Ami, is the log-difference in
material inputs,  Ali,t is  the  log-difference in  number of man-hours  worked,  Aki,, is the  log-
difference in energy usage (our proxy for capital utilization), and the s index varies over sectors.
Having estimated equation (2), we can calculate TFP growth in year t for firm i as the sum of the
firm's fixed effect (ci) and the regression residual (ei,t) --  =A  t+t  t .
Equation (2) does not allow for the fact that the choice of factor inputs may be affected by
the changes in ownership structure or the tightening of financing. While useful as a benchmark
(and popular in studies of productivity growth),  TFP is estimated as a  residual, may capture
effects other than privatization, and does not allow one to control for the possible endogeneity of
factor input choices. For example, privatization (along with other productivity determinants) may
be correlated with the subsequent TFP growth and choice of factor inputs because better firms get
privatized (first).  To  properly control  for  this  and  other  firm-specific factors,  we  augment
equation (2) as follows
Ayit  t  a  +ANit  +I),Am  +/J8  Ak,  +i 4 Pr1v1±  ,8PriV2  + 6 Priv3+  +,  BANKFIN 1 1 +
+ 88tCountryii+(9t  SUBS  it)  +bt  (3)
Under the new specification we can account for changes in the input composition of production as
a  result of  privatization or  hardening of the budget  constraints. Table  3  details  all variables
employed in the analysis.
A major challenge in testing the implications of the SV model is how to  correct for the
endogeneity of privatization itself  This is less likely to be an issue in countries that went through
mass privatization schemes (Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia).  Although some particularly
"bad" enterprises - mainly in the former military production complex and in one-company towns -
were  excluded, mass privatization covered a large number of enterprises and was mandatory.
Poland also completed such a program in late 1994 (initially started in 1991).  In this case firms
could (and did) lobby to be included in the program.  This is usually interpreted to mean that the
better  firms entered  the program  since their managers wanted  quick privatization.  Empirical
analysis (Djankov et al., 1997) shows that the opposite happened.  The majority of the firms that
entered  mass privatization were  worse  than the  average state-owned  firm in  their respective
12sector.  This bias was due to  the distorted expectations of enterprise managers. They initially
expected the program to  be  a  "hospital" set up by the government to  re-vitalize enterprises.
Managers of the better firms, on the other hand, withheld from participation since they expected
bigger gains if they could negotiate with strategic investors.
The endogeneity problem is likely to be more severe in samples where firms were mostly
privatized through  sales to  strategic investors (domestic or foreign).  Sales to  foreign investors
were possibly focused on firms with  substantial market power.  Previous  case study evidence
supports this hypothesis (Carlin et al., 1995).  Sales to domestic strategic investors may have been
driven by superior knowledge of the enterprise growth opportunities. This is especially the case
for privatization to insiders (management buy-outs, management-employee  buy-outs) as discussed
in the Polish case. We address this specific issue in Section VII.
To correct for the possible endogeneity of privatization choices, we perform the empirical
analysis in two steps.  The hypothesis here is that a firm is most likely to be privatized if it was
relatively efficient in  the  pre-privatization period.  The  approach  we  use  is  the  generalized
Heckman two-step  procedure  for  correcting sample selection bias  as  developed  in  Amemiya
(1974).  The method involves separate estimation of the privatization decision and the subsequent
firm productivity growth decision.  The first step is a probit model to determine the probability of
privatization based on pre-privatization efficiency (proxied by the share of variable costs in total
revenues), firm size, and sector origin. 4
VI.  Sample Statistics
We report five sample statistics that relate to efficiency  and enterprise financing. First, we
report the average (and median) employment (SIZE) in four groups of enterprises for the first and
last year in our sample (Table 4, first panel).  The SV model predicts a reduction in excess labor
as  a  result  of  privatization. We  use  t-statistics  to  show  the  statistical  significance of  this
differential labor shedding.  Indeed, enterprises that have been privatized early in the period have
shed the  most  labor.  Labor  productivity (LABPRO)  is  a  useful  measure  of  restructuring,
particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  enterprise  adjustment.  Again,  enterprises  that  have  been
4The  second  step in the Heckman  procedure  involves  an OLS estimation,  using only  privatized  fmns, and results
in sample selection  bias,  defined  as the omitted  variable  problem. The procedure  provides  for a specification  of
the omitted variable that can be used in the truncated sample to alleviate sample selection.  The omitted
variable is the ratio of the value of the standard normal density function  to the value of the standard normal
cumulative distribution function (the inverse Mills ratio) and  is computed directly as part  of the  TSP
econometric  package  we use. Amemiya  (1974) generalized  the Heckman  approach  to include all observations
in the second  step  by developing  a measure  of the inverse  Mills ratio for zero observations,  i.e., for state-owned
firms. We  use  Amemiya's  approach  to calculate  the  inverse  Mills  ratio  and employ  it as an instrument  for  the
unobserved  (by the econometrician)  impacts  on privatization  decisions. The estimating  equation  (3) is
augmented  by the additional  independent  variable  MILLS  - the inverse  Mills ratio calculated  from the results  of
the probit estimation  of privatization  outcomes  on pre-privatization  VCS, firm size,  and sector  origin.
13privatized for over two years improved their labor productivity, while state-owned enterprises did
not.
We next compare the extent of  bank financing (BANKFIN) across ownership categories.
State-owned  firms greatly  increased  their  bank  borrowing,  while privatized firms  borrowed
significantly less.  Subsidies  (SUBS)  were  also  distributed  predominantly  to  state-owned
enterprises. The  exceptions  are Bulgaria and  Romania where  some  partially privatized  firms
received some financing from the budget.  Even there, privatized firms were cut-off from direct
subsidies by the end of the sample period.
We also look at the variable cost share (VCS) over time.  Changes in the VCS reflect a
large number of restructuring measures: labor and wage rationalization, adjustment of input use to
reflect new relative prices, better output quality and higher sales revenues, and the movement of
resources toward  higher-productivity firms and  sectors.  In measuring these changes, we use
variable costs rather than net profit. 5 Using the VCS as an indicator of firm restructuring could be
misleading if relative prices of inputs change dramatically; changes in VCS would consequently be
a poor measure of enterprise performance.  Over the 1989-92 period, this was important as price
controls on many inputs were removed.  It is less important in our sample (1992-95) as the initial
price adjustments had already occurred and dramatic changes in prices had become rarer.  This
measure shows a (statistically significant) increase in VCS as a share of revenues for still state-
owned firms.  On the other hand, firms privatized for three or more years have reduced their
variable cost.
Finally, we  document  the  mean  (median)  statistics  for  TFP-growth  in  each  of  four
ownership groups over time (Table 5).  The most striking fact emerging from the data is that
enterprises that  have been privatized for  more than three  years  (i.e.,  before  1993) show  an
increase in TFP which is five times higher than that of enterprises which have remained state-
owned  (13.2% versus 2.6%).  Enterprises that have been privatized for shorter  periods  also
outperform state firms, albeit to a lesser degree (4.9% and 6.2% versus 2.6%).  The differences in
TF?-growth between state and privatized enterprises are statistically significant for all cohorts of
privatized enterprises.
The simple statistics so far support the predictions of the SV model.  Although indicative,
these measures may be misleading since they do not control for the sectoral composition of each
group.  They are also partial measures which only take into account certain aspects of the relation
5  The difference  is in not accounting  for interest  and other  financial  charges  and depreciation. Interest  and other
financial charges  involve  a redistribution  of income  depending  on the debt and equity  claims  on the enterprise.
Given the  often arbitrary allocation of liabilities under central-planning,  the inclusion of interest could
introduce  unnecessary  noise in measuring  enterprise  restructuring. Depreciation  is an imputed charge-again,
often  based on somewhat  arbitrary  accounting  conventions  (and often different  across  the seven countries),  not
an obligation  to pay someone  else.
14between privatization and enterprise performance.  In particular, firms may have been chosen for
privatization because of their growth potential.  We correct for this possibility by including the
privatization and financing variables directly in the estimating equation in the next section.
VII.  Testing the SV Model
Random-Effects Model
We use equation (3) to estimate the direct effect of privatization and budget constraints on
firm production.  The results are reported in Table 6 using random-effects panel regression over
the 1992-1995 period on the whole sample of enterprises. The explanatory power is good, with
85.1% of the total  cross-time and cross-firm variation in the TFPG explained by the included
independent variables. Sector-specific factor cost variables are always statistically significant in
explaining  enterprise restructuring.
The dummies for each cohort of privatized firms shed light on the effect and time path of
privatization effects.  Privatization turns out to be very important in explaining the variation in
TFPG.  The statistically significant and large positive coefficients on private ownership strongly
suggest that  changes in ownership have had a large positive effect on efficiency and enterprise
restructuring.
Since the  privatization variables  are  dummies, we  can interpret  their  coefficients  as
elasticities and compare them to each other as well as to the situation with no privatization, but
with  the  same (changes in  the)  external environment, including the  softness  of  the  budget
constraint for each firm. The results of Table 6 show that TFP grows by an additional 2.8% in the
first year after privatization.  Second-year privatized firms have 6.1% higher TFPG than state-
owned firms and third-year privatized firms have another 4.2% higher TFP growth.  There is thus
a time pattern among the privatization dummies which suggest that privatization is most effective
in leading to changes in the second year.  By the third year, the effect of privatization, while still
significantly  positive, slows down (but this may also reflect the small number of firms which have
been privatized that long).
To measure the effects of the softness of the budget constraint, we use BANKFIN, the net
transfer from banks to enterprises.  The amount of net new bank lending in each year turns to be
also important in explaining firm performance, albeit first in a negative way and then in a positive
way.  The hypotheses  in  Section III  suggest that  enterprise restructuring would  be  negatively
related to  the  softness of the  budget  constraint,  as  politicians bribe  managers in  return  for
maintaining higher excess employment.  This turns out to be the case for bank financing which
occurred in the year 1992.  For the next year, bank financing is insignificant and for the last year
significantly positive related with  subsequent  TFP-growth.  The  relationships and  associated
elasticities are quite strong: a  100% increase in bank financing decreases subsequent enterprise
15productivity by  1.0 percentage  points  in  1992 while it  increases productivity by  about  0.9
percentage points in 1994.
This particular time-pattern in the regression coefficients -- starting negative and becoming
(more)  positive  --  suggests  the following interpretation. Initially, the  allocation  of  financing
favored subsequently worse performers, as the soft budget hypothesis would suggest.  Politicians
thus appear to have influenced bank lending by directing it to loss-making enterprises, leading to a
negative relationship with subsequent enterprise restructuring.  In later  periods, relatively more
financing went to firms which subsequently improve more.  This suggest that the financial system
improved as  banks  became more  discriminating in  their lending decisions and  lent  more  to
deserving  firms, i.e., firms which subsequently improved.  Banks thus appear to  have become
more independent of politicians over  time, i.e., their loans became less  subsidies  and more
genuine investments leading to productivity growth.
Comparing regressions with and without the bank financing variables (the latter is not
reported) show that the inclusion of the bank lending variable does not diminish the importance of
privatization.  The privatization coefficients are significantly  positive in both regressions and stay
about the same while the explanatory power increases.  This suggests that privatization and the
imposition of financial discipline are complements rather than substitutes and lends further support
to the SV model.  It also suggests that once the initial productivity gains from privatization are
obtained, financing becomes important to sustain TFP-growth.
Including the amount of net transfers each firm receives from the government as a separate
variable does not change the privatization coefficients. The coefficients for SUBS are consistently
negative, suggesting decreasing productivity growth by between 3.3 and 1.4 percentage points for
each 100% change in subsidies.  The coefficients do decline over time, however, suggesting that
the allocation of  subsidies has become  more rational and the  role of  politicians in allocating
subsidies has declined. Furthermore, since subsidies tend to be concentrated in only a few firms,
especially in the later years, the magnitude of  the overall effect of subsidies on overall enterprise
restructuring is relatively small.
The majority of the coefficients on the country-time dummies are significant, but  their
signs differ across countries and over time  - note that Slovenia is the base country. For 1992-93,
the  time  dummy is  significantly negative for  Hungary, Poland,  Romania  and  Slovakia,  and
significantly positive for  the Czech Republic.  For  1994-95, the  time  dummy is  significantly
negative for Bulgaria, and significantly  positive for the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.  For
the Czech Republic, the dummies are thus (significantly) positive over the whole period.  The
dummies for Hungary, Poland and Slovakia show an increase over time.  Bulgaria and Romania
show  no  improvement over  time,  or  even a  deterioration  in  some  specifications (e.g.,  the
coefficients for  Bulgaria  actually  become  significantly negative).  This  upward  time  pattern
suggests that the external environment and overall institutional framework, including the degree
of corruption, improved in most countries.
Two-Step Estimation
16As discussed in Section V, we expect the endogeneity of privatization to  be important.
We attempt to  correct  for the  bias introduced  in selecting firms for  privatization, using pre-
privatization (1991) efficiency and other firm characteristics.  Different hypotheses exist on the
sign  of the  association between pre-privatization efficiency and the likelihood of privatization
depending on the mode of privatization.  If the privatization method is sales to  outsiders, we
would expect to see a positive association since outside investors (in the absence of any additional
knowledge about the  firm) would  interpret past  performance as  a  good  indicator for  future
performance and would invest in firms with high initial efficiency.  If privatization is mainly to
insiders, we may expect to find a perverse relationship. This is because managers would have the
incentive to show poor initial performance so that they could buy the firm at a cheaper price.  The
same could be the case in situations where an outside investor (including foreign investors) would
strike a deal with current management to lower the price in exchange for keeping their jobs.  Thus
it is not clear a priori what association we may find on average across the seven countries.
The results from the first step regressions are reported in Table 7.  We estimate probit
regressions for each individual country and not for the sample as a  whole.  Since the country
regressions  are  more  likely to  capture  the  differences in  selection bias  across  privatization
techniques, we use the MILLS variables generated in these regressions, rather than a full sample
regression that  may obscure the  selection bias.  The coefficients on  the VCS:91 variable are
positive (and significant) for Poland, and Slovenia; negative (and significant) for the Czech and
Slovak Republics, and insignificant for  Bulgaria (negative), Hungary  (positive), and Romania
(negative).  The coefficient in  the full-sample regression is  positive and  insignificant.  This
outcome is somewhat surprising - it could be interpreted to indicate that less efficient firms were
more  likely to  be  privatized  during  1992-95.  We  favor  the  explanation given  earlier  - if
privatization deals went to  insiders, they had the incentive to let pre-privatization performance
slip, so as  to  get  a  better  price.  Indeed,  such hypothesis is  supported  by the  signs across
countries, since Poland and Slovenia had the most insider privatization in the sample and both
show significant positive signs.
We next re-mn equation (3) with the additional variable MILLS (Table 8) for the second-
step regression.  The MILLS coefficients is negative and statistically significant. This  suggests
that some endogeneity in privatization outcomes indeed exists.  The other results are qualitatively
similar to  the ones  reported in  Table 6.  The endogeneity correction influences the  estimated
effects of privatization but not in ways inconsistent with the theory.  The privatization coefficients
remain positive and significant although their magnitude decreases.  Thus in 1994, the coefficient
drops from 6.2% to 4.3%. The coefficients on SUBS also remain the same in sign and relative
magnitude.  The BANKFIN 94 coefficient (marginally) loses its significance.  Some of the country
coefficients change signs. Thus the Czech and Slovak coefficients in the last period turn negative,
while the Bulgaria  coefficient turns positive (but  insignificant).  But  in general  the  two-step
estimation provides further support for the SV model.
17Further Sensitivity Analysis
One potential problem with the data is its different sources.  In particular, one may suspect
that the data for the Czech Republic and Hungary are biased towards better  firms, since "bad"
firms are less  likely to  cooperate  on  a voluntary basis with private  surveys.  In both  cases,
however, this  is not  an important issue.  In Hungary, the  data provider is contracted by the
government to  collect information on all firms which employ more than twenty-five workers.
Such information is collected through the regional business registries.  In the Czech Republic, our
data provider is contracted by the government to  collect and distribute information on all firms
listed on the Prague Stock Exchange or the electronic stock market (RM-System). Thus although
the survey is run by a private firm, replies are mandatory.  A bias of a different nature exists,
however.  The majority of the 2,100 firms listed on either exchange in the Czech Republic are
medium- and large-size.  The sample, as is the case in Hungary, is biased away from small-size
firms.
How  does the  sample selection affect our results for the Czech Republic and Hungary?
We  are likely to  underestimate the effect of privatization on  enterprise performance.  This is
because small firms are usually privatized to  their managers and  the  principal agent problem
between owners and managers, which is present in larger firms, is alleviated.  In the Polish case,
the scarcity of liquidation-privatization  types also leads to a similar bias.  This privatization route
was designed primarily  for management buy-outs where the new (old) management would be able
to buy the firm through  a highly leveraged deal, and at the same time (because of liquidation)
declare the previous labor contracts void.  Since these sales were primarily financed by borrowing,
the ability of the firm to generate cash flow in the short to medium run (during the term of the
loan) was an important factor in deterrnining whether management would decide to  launch the
liquidation procedure.
To test  for possible selection biases across all countries, we restrict  the samples in the
other  five countries  to  firms that  also  have  more than  twenty-five workers  and  operate  in
manufacturing sectors.  These restrictions do not qualitatively affect our results once we re-run all
regressions using the truncated  samples (not reported).  They also alleviate the  endogeneity of
privatization (the coefficient on MILLS in the second-step estimation becomes insignificant), as
argued in Barberis et al., 1996.  The reason is that the most likely candidates for endogeneity are
precisely firms which underwent management buy-outs - managers had the insider knowledge to
proper evaluate the firms and their decision to buy could be treated as a signal of "hidden" value.
The use of balanced samples could also lead to a  selection bias if less productive firms
offered  for  privatization were  not  sold  and  subsequently exited.  It  could  also  lead to  an
overestimate  of the performance of  state enterprises as liquidated state enterprises performed
worse.  Given the lack of data that allow us to use unbalanced samples, and since the number of
liquidated firms in the seven countries was negligible prior to  1996,6  we assume that this oniission
6  Previous  studies  have  argued  that liquidation  of firms  in Hungary  during 1992-93  led to significant  exit. This
is not the case. Although many  firms applied  for liduidation,  the majority  of them  were still in operation  at the
18does not result in a significant bias.  This assumption should, however, be tested  in subsequent
research.
We next test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of different sub-samples of
countries.  We re-run  the empirical model while eliminating each  one  and then  two  country
(countries) from the sample, which gives us six and forty-two additional sub-samples respectively.
It may be the case that privatization has led to increased productivity in one (or more) countries
while it has no significant effects in the majority of countries.  If that were the case, the results
from Tables 7 and 9 cannot be generalized as supporting the SV hypotheses.  The regressions (not
reported) do not  show any qualitative differences from our earlier findings.  The exclusion of
Bulgaria (or Bulgaria paired with most countries) reduces the magnitude but not the significance
of the  privatization coefficients.  This  is likely the  case  since the few  privatization deals in
Bulgaria were  biased towards  the best  firms.  The exclusion of Romania (and  Romania plus
Bulgaria, or Romania plus Hungary) leads to similar results.  The exclusion of Slovenia increases
the  magnitude of  privatization coefficients.  The effects on the  subsidies and  bank-financing
coefficients are also noteworthy.  The exclusion of Bulgaria and Romania turns the BANFIN 94
coefficient significant  (positive), while the exclusion of Hungary turns the BANKFIN 92 coefficient
significant  (and negative).
Finally, we exclude from the sample all firms (across all seven countries) that have been
sold to strategic (outside or inside) investors. This includes all sales to foreigners, managers, and
through direct auctions.  All other privatizations were the result of mass privatization (Czech and
Slovak Republics, Poland, and Slovenia), partial privatizations to banks (in Poland and Slovenia),
or  initial public offerings (in Hungary  and Poland).  The  results  (not  reported)  support  our
previous findings. The privatization coefficient for 1994 shows some decline, but remains positive
and significant.  The exercises in this section reveal the robustness of our results to the particular
sample(s) used.  The theoretical predictions are supported consistently across all countries and
using different sub-samples of privatized firms.
VIII.  Conclusions
This paper tests  the  implications of the  SV model on the  benefits of privatization in
situations where  politicians may influence firms to  pursue political objectives.  The empirical
design we use allows for the effects of stabilization, corruption, and  changes in the legal and
institutional frameworks.  We also avoid the selection biases in previous studies by focusing on
firms in competitive sectors, and explicitly correcting for the endogeneity of privatization choices.
We find strong supportive evidence for the predictions of the SV model.  State-owned
enterprises employ more labor, have lower labor productivity, receive more financing and direct
subsidies, and have higher variable costs than privatized firms, particularly compared to  those
firms privatized for  more than three  years.  State-owned  enterprises  also  show  much lower
end of 1995.  The only exception,  as mentioned,  is Poland  where about 1,000  state-owned  manufacturing  firms
were liquidated.
19productivity growth that  privatized enterprises.  These differences cannot be attributed  to  the
overall  environment in which  enterprises operate  nor  to  the  selection bias  introduced  in  the
privatization  programs.  Correcting  for  a  number of  firm-specific factors,  privatized  firms
consistently outperform state enterprises in terms of productivity growth. We also find empirical
evidence  for  the  SV-prediction  that  lack  of  monetary  tightness  discourages  enterprise
restructuring,  at  least in the  early period  of transition.  Over time the  role  of  politicians in
allocating bank financing and subsidies appears to have declined, however, and the importance of
banks in allocating resources (efficiently) increased.  Finally, the overall institutional environment
appears to have improved in almost all countries, suggesting that the influence of corruption has
declined over time.
The  results  demonstrate  the  beneficial  effects  of  privatization  in  the  presence  of
stabilization and decreasing corruption.  Further research could study the effect of various types
of privatization on managerial behavior and enterprise efficiency as our research suggests that
there  are  large  differences across  countries,  possibly associated  with  the  fact  that  certain
privatization methods dominated in particular countries.
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23Table 1: Theory Predictions
(Effects on Enterprise Performance)
Policy  Soft Financing  Excess  Labor  Efficiency
no  full  no  full  no  full
corruption  corruption  corruption  corruption  corruption  corruption
privatization without  ?  0  +  0  0
deregulation and without
stabilization
privatization  cum  +  0  0  +  0
deregulation, but without
stabilization
privatization cum  deregulation  0  ++  0
cum stabilization
Source: SV model.  Notes: 0 indicates no effect; ? indicates  the theory is inconclusive;  + means a  positive effect; ++
indicates a large positive effect; -indicates a negative effect;  - indicates a large negative effect.
24Table 2: Statistics on Sample of Firms
Bulgaria  Czech Rep  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Slovak Rep  Slovenia
A.  Data Coverage
No of firms  828  706  1,044  1,066  1,064  883  763
Number of Employees  418,382  829,312  428,645  1,338,629  2,678,436  578,737  272,249
1992
% of total*  48  64  41  45  93  93  92
B.  Size of Firms (Number of Employees)
Mean  505  627  425  911  1521  656  357
Median  291  409  241  820  1327  335  213
C.  Degree of Privatization
% of firms  8  89  67  61  15  79  41
% of total output  7  93  65  60  12  83  42
D.  Average Share of Sector Employment in Total Employment
Food  12.0  5.4  11.2  8.7  8.4  13.7  10.4
Tobacco  0.8  1.5  2.6  1.1  1.6  0.8  1.9
Textiles  9.0  5,5  13.0  8.5  6.9  4.2  12.9
Apparel  5.1  2.3  3.7  1.9  1.1  3.4  5.8
Lumber  8.4  3.6  3.5  2.3  8.8  4.3  3.0
Furnifure  2.8  1.2  2.8  2.0  5.5  1.6  3.2
Paper  3.1  1.5  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.9  1.7
Printing  0.7  3.3  0.9  0.4  5.1  2.9  1.1
Chemicals  6.7  2.3  8.0  7.9  8.8  7.6  8.0
Petroleum  reflning  3.8  2.6  4.4  3.2  6.7  1.0  1.0
Rubber  1.9  1.4  4.3  4.5  1.6  2.7  2.2
Leather  3.5  1.5  2.5  2.6  3.3  3.0  3.5
Stone,  clay,  glass  2.7  14.6  5.4  7.6  3.7  4.6  1.5
Primary  metals  6.2  7.0  9.1  ,0.6  1.8  4.8  13.5
Fabricated  metals  2.9  9.8  3.9  4.6  10.3  14.6  4.0
Nonelectrical  machinery  17.5  16.2  5.6  15.2  9.2  10.0  4.1
Electrical  machinery  4.3  3.0  10.9  3.2  3.6  5.0  14.1
Transport  equipment  0.8  12.6  3.7  11.6  9.0  8.8  2.4
Instruments  7.6  3.8  2.3  2.2  2.2  4.1  5.3
Miscellaneous  0.2  0.9  0.6  0.5  0.9  1.0  0.4
* Share of 1992 manufacturing employment as reported in the Statistical Yearbooks of the respective
countries.
25Table 3: Description of Variables
TFPG  Total Factor Productivity Growth
SIZE  Number of employees
LABPRO  Value-added  (sales minus materisl expenditures)  per worker in constant  $US 1995.
BANKFIN  ratio of the change in total debt outstanding (net of interest charges) over sales revenue
SUBS  Direct subsidies from the budget,
VCS  variable cost  share, wages  plus material inputs over total sales
PRIV 1.  2,  3  Dummy for each cohort of firms in temis of the years following their privatization
COUNTRYii  Dummy for each country, as follows: DBUL (Bulgaria, DCZE (Czech  Rep), DHUN
(Hungary), DPOL (Poland), DROM (Romania), DSVK (Slovak Rep), DSVN (Slovenia).
DSECi  Dummy for Sectors, as follows: Food and Kindred products (FOOD),  Tobacco
Manufactures (TOB), Textiles (TEX), Apparel  (APP), Lumber and Wood Products
(WOOD), Furniture and Fixtures (FUR), Paper (PAP), Prnting and Publishing (PRI),
Chemicals  (CHE), Petroleum  refining (PET), Rubber (RUB), Leather (LEA), Stone and
Cement (STO), Metals (MET), Nonelectrical Machinery  (NMA), Electrical  machinery
(EMA), Transport Equipment (TRA),  istruments (INS)
DYEARt  Dummyfor Years, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995. 1996 istakenasanumeraire
26Table 4: Testing the Shleifer-Vishny Hypotheses
Number  of Workers  Labor  Productivity  Bank Financing  Direct Subsidies  Variable  Cost Share
1992  1995  t-stat  1992  1995  t-stat  1992  1995  t-stat  1992  1995  t-stat  1992  1995  t-stat
State-ownedfinns  1,159  1,044  1.244  7,854  7,489  0.783  31.5  63.8  -19.691*  0.062  0.011  21.361*  84.3  85.9  -3.092*
(3,752  firms)  (535)  (429)  (7,135)  (6,742)  (18.2)  (30.6)  (0.054)  (0.013)  (81.1)  (82.2)
Privatized  in 1994  575  468  1.232  9,175  10,574  -1.208  26.8  36.5  -1.396  0.021  0.000  15.261*  90.6  90.0  0.464
(365 firms)  (291)  (241)  (8,675)  (9,126)  (15.2)  (17.8)  (0.018)  (0.000)  (91.3)  (90.4)
Privatizedin 1993  1,154  957  1.487  9,468  11,527  -3.001*  24.1  23.8  0,080  0.008  0.000  1.805**  87.3  86.4  1.354
(846 finns)  (526)  (367)  (9,241) (10,984)  (19.2)  (18.5)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (87.2)  (86.2)
Privatized  before  1993  761  625  2.800*  11,524  14,857  -5.221*  33.9  27.8  2.483*  0.003  0.000  0.890  85.9  83.6  4.933*
(1,391  finns)  (331)  (224)  (10,528) (13,652)  (21.6)  (17.4)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (83.7)  (81.5)
* Significant at the 95% level.  Median values in parentheses.
27Table 5: Total Factor Productivity Growth by Ownership
(Annual Rates of Growth)
1992-93  1993-94  1994-95  1992-95  t-test
State-owned  firms  0.011  0.012  0.005  0.026
(3,752 fimns)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.022)
Privatized  in 1994  0.016  -0.014  0.066  0.062  -6.869*
(365 finms)  (0.018)  (-0.007)  (0.047)  (0.049)
Privatizedin 1993  -0.009  0.018  0.039  0.049  -4.206*
(846 firms)  (-0.008)  (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.045)
Privatized  before  1993  0.062  0.045  0.023  0.132  -12.157*
(1,391 firms)  (0.044)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.117)
T  Significant at the 95% level.  Median values in parentheses.  T-tests between state-owned
firms and other firms for the 1992-95 period.
28Table 6: Estimation Results on
Privatization, Subsidies and Financial Tightening









PRIV 3+  0.039*
(8.512)
SUBS 1992  -0.033*
(6.723)
SUBS 1993  -0.023*
(4.538)
SUBS 1994  -0.014
(1.455)
BANKFIN 1992  -0.010
(1.437)
BANKFIN 1993  0.007
(0.376)
BANKFIN 1994  0.009*
(2.034)
Country-Time Duimmies
Year  DBUL  DCZE  DHUN  DPOL  DROM  DSVK
1992-93  -0.006  0.012*  -0.010  -0.011**  -0.021 *  0.002
(0.698)  (2.024)  (1.465)  (1.813)  (2.143)  (0.226)
1993-94  -0.061*  0.047*  0.007  0.019*  -0.035*  0.038*
(3.658)  (6.296)  (1.008)  (2.124)  (4.235)  (5.324)
1994-95  -0.035**  0.022  0.008  0.014*  -0.026  0.057*
(1.772)  (1.728)  (1.785)  (2.336)  (1.436)  (6.452)
Sample Size  19,062
Durbin-Watson Statistics  1.945
Adjusted R
2 0.851
The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent.  t-Statistics (absolute values) shown in parentheses.  *  Significant at
the 95% level.  **  Significant at the 90% level.
29Table 7: Endogeneity of Privatization
(first step estimation,  probit regression)
DBUJL  DCZE  DHUN  DPOL  DROM  DSVK  DSVN
Dependent variable is Privatization Choice (I if privatized, 0 if not)
Constant  -1.021  0.502  -0.849  -2.092  -1.137  -0.537  -3.397
(1.412)  (1.026)  (2.196)  (5.122)  (1.076)  (1.164)  (6.162)
VCS:1991  -0.625  -1.223  0.719  2.854  -0.065  -0.172  4.312
(1.489)  (2.842)  (1.651)  (9.628)  (0.234)  (1.798)  (6.642)
SIZE  -0.025  -0.048  -0.016  -0.146  -0.138  -0.049  -0.094
(0.238)  (0.908)  (0.419)  (5.574)  (1.978)  (0.876)  (2.354)
FOOD  -0.158  0.295  0.015  0.158  0.226  0.518  0.158
(0.438)  (2.354)  (0.897)  (0.749)  (1.358)  (2.774)  (0.879)
TOB  0.493  0.683  0.248  0.609  0.674  -0.157  -0.485
(0.826)  (2.425)  (3.254)  (1.226)  (2.158)  (0.478)  (1.479)
TEX  0.374  0.112  0.615  0.189  0.138  0.248  0.245
(2.847)  (0.449)  (2.724)  (0.754)  (0.348)  (2.897)  (1.054)
APP  0.186  0.905  0.572  0.115  0.711  0.251  0.154
(0.462)  (3.478)  (2.145)  (4.518)  (1.268)  (2.135)  (1.897)
WOOD  -0.235  -0.347  -0.224  -0.642  -0.037  -0.574  -0.054
(0.648)  (1.982)  (0.908)  (2.264)  (0.087)  (2.106)  (0.857)
FUR  -0.157  0.553  -0.125  -0.152  -0.068  -0.296  0.036
(0.349)  (1.695)  (0.507)  (0.309)  (2.441)  (2.041)  (0.125)
PAP  0.097  0.115  0.038  noprivate  0.694  0.044  -0.162
(2.196)  (3.138)  (1.992)  (2.123)  (1.178)  (1.457)
PRI  noprivate  0.011  0.296  0.185  noprivate  -0.748  -0.075
(0.029)  (0.895)  (2.916)  (2.948)  (1.305)
CHE  0.091  -0.264  0.057  0.928  0.924  -0.063  -0.192
(2.534)  (0.785)  (0.278)  (4.087)  (2.418)  (0.274)  (0.778)
RUB  0.274  -0.306  -0.274  -0.102  no private  -0.055  0.256
(1.015)  (0.968)  (1.085)  (1.542)  (2.124)  (0.957)
LEA  0.135  0.144  0.882  0.682  0.518  0.195  0.024
(2.341)  (0.328)  (2.537)  (2.724)  (1.957)  (0.748)  (2.157)
STO  -0.237  0.225  -0.215  -0.374  -0.157  -0.342  no private
(0.578)  (1.892)  (0.857)  (0.937)  (1.658)  (1.387)
MET  noprivate  0.256  0.167  -0.487  noprivate  0.504  0.095
(1.364)  (1.718)  (2.327)  (2.078)  (0.284)
NMA  -0.135  -0.211  0.271  0.115  noprivate  0.457  -0.131
(1.568)  (0.695)  (1.254)  (0.388)  (1.978)  (0.547)
EMA  0.074  0.452  0.189  -0.061  0.402  0.108  -0.064
(2.689)  (1.909)  (2.748)  (0.206)  (1.138)  (0.516)  (1.968)
TRA  0.167  0.678  0.225  0.162  -0.087  0.211  0.084
(0.587)  (4.152)  (2.035)  (0.709)  (0.178)  (1.149)  (0.328)
INS  -0.059  0.771  -0.425  -0.082  0.674  -0.034  -0.151
(1.125)  (2.451)  (3.542)  (0.245)  (2.539)  (0.524)  (4.278)
Sample Size  828  706  1044  1066  1064  883  763
p7  0.034  0.023  0.049  0.174  0.021  0.014  0.127
T-stats  in parentheses.
30Table 8: Estimation Results on
Privatization, Subsidies and Financial Tightening
(TFP-growth,  second-step  estimation)
Constant  -0.001
(0.224)
Sector-specific input variables included  Yes
MILLS  -0.018
(4.658)
PRIV 1  0.032
(8.202)
PRIV  2  0.041
(15.497)
PRIV 3+  0.037
(9.567)
SUBS 1992  -0.010
(2.478)
SUBS 1993  -0.014
(2.154)
SUBS 1994  -0.006
(1.197)
BANKFIN 1992  -0.017
(1.415)
BANKFIN 1993  0.001
(0.166)
BANKFIN 1994  0.007
(1.968)
Country-Time Dummies
Year  DBUL  DCZE  DHUN  DPOL  DROM  DSVK
1992-93  -0.024  0.019  -0.004  -0.015  -0.024  0.006
(3.561)  (2.495)  (0.642)  (2.441)  (4.045)  (0.722)
1993-94  -0.033  0.028  0.008  0.021  -0.031  0.033
(7.451)  (6.763)  (1.355)  (3.352)  (9.462)  (6.982)
1994-95  0.007  -0.012  -0.002  0.012  -0.008  -0.013
(1.584)  (7.574)  (1.449)  (4.785)  (0.764)  (6.827)
Sample Size  19,062
Durbin-Watson Statistics  2.009
Adjusted R
2 0.826
The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent . t-Statistics (absolute values) shown in parentheses.
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